



doi.org/10.66182/Antarvidya.V2.I1.006.2026

The Inner Dimension of Freedom: A Study of K. C. Bhattacharyya's Philosophy

Dr. Dayamoy Maji

Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Bankura University

dmphilbku@gmail.com

Submitted on: 15/11/2025

Accepted on: 28/06/2026

Abstract:

K. C. Bhattacharyya (1909-1990), an eminent Indian philosopher, demonstrated the importance of human freedom by defining liberty as including not only political and social aspects, but also intellectual, spiritual, and moral ones. This essay examines Bhattacharyya's intellectual contributions to the freedom argument using Indian philosophy, Western existentialism, and contemporary issues of moral choice and autonomy. The writer examined Bhattacharyya's works on consciousness, awareness, moral obligation, and community service and discovered that the philosopher rethinks freedom as a concept that evolves based on moral appraisal and self-reflection. His philosophy differs from positivist and libertarian viewpoints in that he regards freedom as the growth of self-aware, self-reflective, and ethically responsible action. We may observe that Bhattacharyya's theories are still relevant today by considering the philosophical, social, and political issues that compel individuals and groups to accept moral responsibility.

Keywords: Freedom, Social, Political, Ethical, Selfhood.

For a long time, the concept of freedom has been central to philosophical inquiry. It transcends cultural and historical borders to meet the basic needs of all people. In Western traditions, freedom is frequently defined in terms of political liberty, moral autonomy, or psychological choice. This can be found in the works of John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Mill defined negative freedom as being unconstrained by external pressures, Kant as adhering to a logical moral norm in the noumenal universe, and Sartre as having to take care of one's own duties. These theories contend that the best approach to understand about freedom is via the lens of how a person interacts with their social, moral, or philosophical environment. Freedom in Eastern philosophies, such as phenomenology and Indian Vedanta, is centered on the individual and seeks to liberate people from their own constraints and help them comprehend their actual nature. This inner portion of freedom, also known as moksha or spiritual emancipation, calls into question Western philosophy's notion of object and subject. It shifts the focus from outside forces to the transcendence of the person. Most of the attention is on the modern Indian philosopher Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya (1875–1949). Through his unique blend of Indian metaphysical traditions and Western critical thought, Bhattacharyya rethinks freedom not as a social construct but as an inner truth that can not be changed. To create a philosophy that fought culture dominance and pushed for intellectual independence, or

“swaraj in ideas,” Bhattacharyya drew on Advaita Vedanta, Jain pluralism, and Kantian critique. He did this in the midst of intellectual debates in his time. Born in India when it was a colony. His most famous work, *The Subject as Freedom* (1930), is an example of this. It says that freedom is the gradual understanding of subjectivity that comes from becoming more self-aware. Instead of traditional Indian philosophers who based freedom on religious texts, Bhattacharyya used a phenomenological approach to study awareness by looking inside oneself. He claims that emancipation from objectification, or the “self,” is a dynamic process that evolves throughout time. This is one of several *Studies in Philosophy* he has published. It elevates science above other topics and raises problems about what scientists can know. Bhattacharyya fought a direct war against colonialism in his philosophy, arguing for the revival of native methods of thinking while acknowledging the usefulness of Western reasoning. He believed that freedom entails more than simply not having to worry about the government. It also meant being free in your mind and heart.

Bhattacharyya's theory is founded on the notion that the subject's autonomy is inextricably tied to their isolation from objective reality. He stated in his seminal work, *The Subject as Freedom*, that “the subject is recognized as 'I' without being intended by 'I'; it is speaking and not speaking...” This quote summarizes the notion. According to Bhattacharyya (1930, p. 45), freedom is felt when one expresses one's true self, which differs from one's assumed or perceived self. As Bhattacharyya puts out, “I” is more than a notion or a theory; it is a genuine sense of autonomy that is both immediate and unattainable. This phrase exemplifies how independence is a battle within yourself to say who you are without being constrained by what you think or how you see things. This is considerably different from Kant's paradigm, which holds that categorical imperatives limit freedom and that it can only be attained through the noumenal self rather than through events. Kant thought that “the idea of freedom, as its reality is demonstrated by an apodictic law of practical reason, serves as the keystone of the entire framework of a system of pure reason” (1788/1997, p. 3). This resulted in the duality of phenomena and noumenon. Bhattacharyya responds to Kant's question by proposing an order of freedoms: bodily, mental, and spiritual. This explains what the subject is. At each stage, we deconstruct objectifications and demonstrate the self as pure freedom. Freedom, according to Vedantins, is perceived as a natural split rather than as rationally organized. This lets you understand the absolute intuitively.

Western ideas usually see freedom as something outside of us (for example, Sartre's “man is condemned to be free” as a radical choice amidst absurdity; Sartre, 1943/1956, p. 439); Bhattacharyya, on the other hand, sees freedom as something inside of us, similar to Advaita's non-dual reality. These differences show how new his ideas are. In British-ruled India, this theory pushed against the empiricism hierarchies that were in place and for a cosmopolitanism that let people experience different cultures without becoming like them. Through his view of freedom, which he calls “as magic, as freedom, and as nought” (Bhattacharyya, 1930, p. 101), Bhattacharyya attacks objectivism. In this view, the unreal is not pushed down, but rather raised in the mind. In contrast to Hegelian dialectics, which is based on absolutes, this model includes different points of view through Jain *anekantavada*, which encourages a pluralistic understanding. In attempt to shed light on these nuances, the authors of “*The Inner Dimension of Freedom: A Study of K. C. Bhattacharyya's Philosophy*” investigated why Bhattacharyya's paradigm remains relevant in today's worldwide discussions about freedom and identity. This essay discusses his phenomenological method and the Vedantin base. It emphasizes the importance of freedom as a means of achieving self-realization and attempts to reconcile Eastern and Western ideologies. This essay argues that Bhattacharyya's philosophy can assist solve present moral dilemmas by discussing colonial brutality against knowledge and promoting an inner freedom that prevents the exterior from collapsing.

Philosophical Context and Influences:

Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's ideas emerged in India in the early twentieth century, as native intellectual processes were revived and the country was still recuperating from colonial authority. By studying both Western critical philosophy and ancient Indian systems, Bhattacharyya developed his own subjective perspective of freedom. He excelled at reconciling problems between idealism, nondualism, and realism. His writings are heavily influenced by the Bengal Renaissance, an intellectual movement led by Swami Vivekananda and Rabindranath Tagore that sought to revive Vedantic philosophy while also assimilating Western concepts. Bhattacharyya differs from revivalist nationalists in that he sees freedom as an inner experience rather than a socially constructed ideal. Introspection is the most crucial thing for him. Using the principles of the Swadeshi movement, which emphasized independence, Bhattacharyya expanded this framework to include “*swaraj* in ideas,” arguing for an autonomous Indian philosophy that interacts with European thought while being distinct from it. He developed a theory that anticipates postcolonial philosophy after reading Kantian criticism and observing how it portrays dualisms through Vedantic lenses. This was also affected by the colonial educational system. Advaita Vedanta, particularly Shankara's non-dualist perspective on reality, was immensely significant to Bhattacharyya. This philosophy holds that when a person transcends duality, their *atman* (true self) merges with *Brahman* (ultimate truth). Because he studied Eastern thought, Bhattacharyya was able to show that Western ideas of freedom as an action in the outside world were wrong by redefining liberty as freedom from objectification. His source for *anekantavada* is Jainism, which is a diverse way of thinking about knowledge that, unlike Hegelian synthesis, lets arguments go on without a final answer. The Western thought Bhattacharyya is very important. He looked at subjectivity through the lens of Immanuel Kant's transcendental idealism. On the other hand, Bhattacharyya said that people might know themselves naturally and disagreed with Kant's idea that the noumenon is unknown. Bhattacharyya turned G. W. F. Hegel's hierarchical view of consciousness on its head by focusing on internal negation instead of historical evolution. Hegel's dialectical method had led to this view. Bhattacharyya also mixed it with Vedantic absolutism, but Edmund Husserl's phenomenology is clear in the way he says we must separate ourselves from the external world in order to see our own subjective qualities.

All of these things add up to Bhattacharyya's meaning of freedom as the subject's freedom from becoming an object. In his seminal work, *Studies in Vedantism* (1907), he used Vedantic denial (*neti neti*) to demonstrate that everything is free and investigates how the ego might transcend the constraints of reality. One notable quotation from *The Subject as Freedom* states, “Freedom is the denial of the objective, the felt transcendence of the meant or known, and this denial is not a mere thought but a felt reality” (Bhattacharyya, 1930, p. 32). According to Bhattacharyya, the subject's independence from external reality is realized through self-awareness, rather than intellectual abstraction. He emphasizes that freedom is the feeling of negation. This quote challenges *Anubhava*, the perception of the Vedas, and Western reason. It shows his phenomenological shift toward freedom as something to be “experienced” instead of taken for granted. “Kant wrote in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that freedom is connected to the moral will in the noumenal world. In everyday life, freedom means that the power of choice is not limited by the urges of sensibility (Kant, 1781/1998, A534/B562). Kant claimed that phenomena (empirical truth) and noumena (things in and of themselves) are fundamentally different, and that practical reason is the only way to be free. It is difficult to define for certain what the self is since free will operates in a realm separate from our emotions and is constrained by hazy moral standards. According to Bhattacharyya, there are three levels of freedom: physical (not being bound by tangible objects), psychological (not being bound by mental pictures), and spiritual (being completely subjective). He claims that introspective denial can help you achieve all three levels of freedom. This is how he resolves the contradiction. His “felt

transcendence,” inspired by Advaita, bridges Kant's chasm without relying on religion. It makes freedom a genuine and intelligible concept, rather than something that happens right now. Kant regards things as real but restricted in what we can know. Bhattacharyya, on the other hand, can regard the objective as “unreal” but genuinely existing, like maya, due to his Vedantic perspective.

Hegel's idea of dialectical freedom in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* says, “The process of Spirit is to know what it is, and this knowing is its liberation” (Hegel, 1807/1977, p. 265). This shows that the two ideas are not the same in this situation. Hegel said that freedom comes from the dialectical process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Hegel also said that social recognition is how individual knowledge becomes freedom. This process is how pure spirit has grown over time. Bhattacharyya, who was influenced by Jain pluralism, was against this teleological growth. Instead, he pushed for an ascension that happened within, was not tied to time, and did not use dialectics. Instead, he believed in subjective absolutism. He goes against Hegel's social philosophy by rejecting Western historicism in favor of indigenous non-dualism. He also seeks freedom by living alone and thinking about himself. Bhattacharyya uses many parts of British idealism in his synthesis, especially F. H. Bradley's absolute. But he alters it by prioritizing subjective pleasure (bhukti) over logical correctness. In his critique of Western objectivism in “Swaraj in Ideas” (1928), he demonstrates how European ideas helped liberate colonized India and warns against copying them. Postcolonial scholars today, such as Frantz Fanon, were moved by this essay because it demonstrated how Bhattacharyya's theory may be utilized to decolonize the mind from the inside out. Bhattacharyya rethinks freedom as an inner characteristic that transcends cultural divides, employing ideas from both the East and the West. This is based on his intellectual background and the concepts that have influenced him. His work opposes reductionist perspectives by establishing a complex framework that promotes the growth of influences through inventive recontextualizations rather than simple appropriations. This results in a philosophy that can be used by anyone and is based on subjective profundity.

The Inner Dimension of Freedom:

His ideas are based on the idea of the “inner dimension of freedom,” which changes the way we talk about freedom from how it affects people outside of us to how it affects us inside of us. Bhattacharyya says that freedom is not something that people are born with, but something that people achieve as they move through life and stop being objects. People become more and more cut off from the outside world as they move up the ladder of inner freedom, which has levels for physical, mental, and spiritual freedom. Being physically free means being able to do what makes you happy without seeing your body as something you need to own. As a person moves up the psychological grade, they get rid of thoughts and wants that hold them back and reach mental detachment. Last but not least, the highest level of spiritual growth is becoming fully subjective, or knowing oneself as pure freedom. Vedantic negation says that the only way to be truly free is to reject the “meant” or known self and show an unchanging “I” that talks instead of being spoken. This is where the thought originates. Bhattacharyya believes that the world is “unreal” but can be experienced. The subject is both separate from and below the object, which contradicts most ontologies. This emphasis on the individual prioritizes sensation above logic, which contradicts the rationalist and empiricist schools of thinking prevalent in Western philosophy. According to Bhattacharyya, freedom is more than an idea; it is a “felt reality” that may be achieved by foregoing what you desire. As Bhattacharyya (1930, p. 78) says, “The freedom of the subject is the denial of the object as such, not the denial of this or that object; it is the felt transcendence of the objective attitude altogether.” This idea is shown in a key quote from his work. In this comment, Bhattacharyya talks about freedom as an experience negation in which the subject understands its own sovereignty by pulling away from awareness that is focused on things. Instead of passively giving in, this “felt transcendence” actively asserts one's

independence, similar to the freedom that comes from understanding that bondage is an illusion in Vedantic moksha. As an empiricist, John Locke said that freedom does not come from choosing or having will, but from being able to do or not do things based on what your mind tells you should be done. This is very different from Western views, like this one (Locke, 1690/1975, Book II, Ch. XXI, p. 8). Bhatt says that Locke's idea of freedom is subject-object because it is relational, external, based on empirical agency, and depending on social processes. Locke believed in freedom based on facts and reasoned choice. Bhattacharyya's idea of inner freedom goes further than empiricism by focusing on subjective intuition that, when practiced with enough inner detachment, makes outside restrictions meaningless.

Existentialist views are very different from Bhattacharyya's idea because it looks at freedom without worrying about it. When Jean-Paul Sartre says, "Man is condemned to be free; because once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does" (Sartre, 1946/2007, p. 29), he means that people are responsible for everything they do. Sartre's heavy idea of freedom comes from the philosophical emptiness that comes from choices that shape essence and are woven together with interpersonal relationships and the gaze of the other. This makes freedom seem like an endless quest full of lies and fights. Based on Advaita non-dualism, Bhattacharyya reinterprets it this way: freedom is not condemnation, but a state of pure awareness that is free of relational relations. His steady rise makes it possible for a structured transcendence, which unites the spiritual level more than Sartre's broken self. This difference between Bhattacharyya's Vedantic positivity and Sartre's atheistic pessimism is that Bhattacharyya sees inner freedom as harmonious self-enjoyment instead of frenetic creation.

Also, Bhattacharyya's private view raises questions Hegel by saying that historical Geist is what makes freedom possible: "The history of the world... is the process by which the spirit discovers itself and its own idea" (Hegel, 1837/1956, p. 457). Governmental groups use Hegel's ideas of negation and synthesis to talk about joint and temporal freedom. By talking about Jain *anekantavada*, Bhattacharyya disagrees with this trend of things happening in order. Instead, he supports an atemporal pluralistic denial, which sees many truths without limiting them to a single explanation. Hegel's collectivism is fought against by subjective absolutism, and he defines freedom through meditation and individualism. To do this, he puts Indian reflection above Western historicism. When applied to present situations, Bhattacharyya's theory offers tools for decolonization from the inside out, in line with postcolonial and phenomenological discourses. He derives power from his independence, despite the fact that globalization has brought much turmoil. This encourages him to explore his emotions further and finally achieve complete independence. Bhattacharyya's philosophy mixes Eastern intuition with Western criticism to demonstrate what true freedom is, to call superficial liberties into question, and to motivate individuals to reform themselves on a fundamental level.

Social and Political Implications:

Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's idea of "internal freedom" has political and social effects that go beyond intellectual thought. These effects can be felt in both colonial and postwar settings. Because Bhattacharyya believes in "swaraj in ideas," his philosophical work fights against the epistemic bullying of colonial powers and encourages people to free their minds through their own efforts. People who fight for personal liberty as a way to stop being seen as objects are challenging authoritarian systems that keep people under social or imperial control. Being able to rule yourself on the inside helps you fight against oppression, which in turn frees the group. Bhattacharyya suggested three levels of liberation: physical, mental, and spiritual. These levels offer a way out of internalized oppressions and back into control for people who are oppressed in a society where inequality is common. This points to an anarchic type of self-government in which real democracy comes from citizens rising above power dynamics rather than changes to institutions. Bhattacharyya says that freedoms on the surface can hide deeper oppressions in

his critique of modern nationalism and globalization. Postcolonial societies that still do things the way they did them during colonialism are an example of the kind of cosmetic liberty that he thinks is bad. Inner freedom helps build a diverse society through the practice of Jain *anekantavada*, which lets people see things from different points of view. The goal is not to force equality, but to encourage empathy through personal reflection, which has effects on social fairness. It supports intellectual independence and fights Western dominance by calling for culture and educational programs that put native ways of knowing at the center.”We shall not attain *swaraj* in ideas until we cease to see the products of Western culture as equal to culture itself” (Bhattacharyya, 1954, p. 103), as Bhattacharyya said in a powerful quote from his 1928 work “*Swaraj in Ideas*.” He says that intellectual freedom means rejecting culture imitation and, more specifically, objectivities that are imposed from the outside. Gandhi said, “*Swaraj* is a sacred word, a Vedic word, meaning self-rule and self-restraint” (Gandhi, 1909/1938, p. 73). Mahatma Gandhi's idea of political *swaraj*, on the other hand, stressed economic independence and nonviolent self-government. Gandhi's idea of freedom is praxis-oriented, with a focus on spiritual and political elements as well as group action to fight outside oppressors. Bhattacharyya thinks of *swaraj* as phenomenological separation instead of the relational ethics of *satyagraha*. He sees it as a way to fight colonial dualisms through subjective absolutism. Because of this focus on Vedanta, his independence is more contemplative and less militant, but it still works for long-term culture opposition. Bhattacharyya supports nonviolent inner negation and says that freedom comes from realizing oneself rather than conflict. This is different from Frantz Fanon's view that postcolonial violence is a way to free people because “Decolonization is always a violent phenomenon” (Fanon, 1961/2004, p. 1). There is a politics of subtle change at play here, and it affects modern social movements such as decolonial schooling and mindfulness-based activism. It says that mental separation is the key to a long-lasting life and does not agree with materialism's focus on things as things. It makes democracies stronger in times of global crisis by protecting people from being used as objects by the government. In this way, it publicly fights authoritarianism. When you think of freedom as something deep inside you that can change society, Bhattacharyya's idea connects the private and public areas.

Freedom and the Philosophy of Action:

Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's philosophical writings change the way we think about the connection between freedom and action by stressing the importance of knowing yourself on the inside more than having strong willpower on the outside. The notion that activity is what freedom is all about is a recurring topic in Western philosophical structures. Free will manifests as conscious choice and personal responsibility. Bhattacharyya, on the other side, claims that true freedom is not free will, but rather isolation from oneself. He discusses his psychological perspective on freedom in *The Subject as Freedom*. He defined freedom as the process by which a subject eventually abandons the role of an object. In this scenario, action is viewed as a means of thinking about separation rather than a force that moves objects. This independence from within stems from events that do not occur outside of you, calling into question the notion that doing things makes you human. When action and freedom work in tandem, freedom becomes a symbolic refusal that is felt rather than done, resulting in spiritual freedom. According to Bhattacharyya, full freedom occurs when the relationship between agent and act is severed. This results in pure subjectivity, in which the self is free of all conditions, including those of will. He says this is different from action-oriented beliefs, which make things into objects. A well-known quote from Bhattacharyya that says, “The subject as freedom is not freedom of will or action but freedom from the objective, a felt independence that is speaking without being spoken” (Bhattacharyya, 1930, p. 56) shows this. He stresses that self-enjoyment must be free from the objectifying trends of action in order to be possible. Instead of making choices, people

who want to experience “felt independence” must think about things and express themselves beyond the limits of means and ends. Kant's theory of action, on the other hand, says that freedom means the will is not controlled by sensual urges: “Freedom in the practical sense is the will's independence of coercion through impulses” (Kant, 1788/1997, p. 41). Kant said that freedom allows for logical self-legislation in the face of events that are predetermined, which means that behavior is subject to moral law. Bhattacharyya replies to his dualism by saying that freedom is non-volitional transcendence that is free from Kantian antinomies and can be reached through graded subjectivity. His dualism, on the other hand, says that freedom is limited to noumenal agency, which means that people have to do things to meet moral obligations.

One of the most important ideas in Jean-Paul Sartre's philosophy is that “freedom is what you do with what has been done to you” (Sartre, 1943/1956, p. 567). This concept relates freedom and action. In Sartre's insane world, where doing nothing is considered bad faith, freedom entails always doing something. By denying himself, Bhattacharyya demonstrates that freedom is a joyous separation from things, not a burdensome obligation. He supports Vedantic quietism, not existential violence. This point of view supports the assumption that you can be free by doing nothing, and it rejects the notion that doing something will render you more bound down. Bhattacharyya's perspective encourages people in performative cultures to stay still and consider what they are doing in order to maintain peace between individuals and communities. It also modifies people's perspectives on ethics beyond deontology and consequentialism.

Contemporary Relevance:

Despite its colonial roots, Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's theories regarding the inner part of freedom are still relevant in an age of globalization, digital surveillance, and existential problems. Social media, and the feelings of isolation that accompany it, are increasing the prevalence of mental health issues. In response, Bhattacharyya recommends an approach for developing inner resilience similar to mindfulness but based on phenomenological detachment. This method provides varying degrees of freedom for the body, mind, and soul. By emphasizing subjective transcendence, he combats our consumerist society's tendency to objectify humans, reducing them to numbers or economic units. Today, discussions of the global south's epistemologies demonstrate how Bhattacharyya's “swaraj in ideas” encourages postcolonial decolonial movements fighting for intellectual sovereignty rather than cultural homogeneity. He claims that subjects in fields such as bioethics and AI ethics are inevitably subjective. As a result, he challenges algorithmic determinism and advocates for human agency, which differs from machine learning's prediction frameworks. His pluralistic viewpoint, influenced by Jain *anekantavada*, encourages discourse over conflict in this period of identity politics and nationalist administrations. He prefers a cosmopolitanism that values the freedoms of others rather than promoting unity. A crucial passage from Bhattacharyya's *Studies in Philosophy* demonstrates its significance: “Freedom is the reality of the subject, experienced as the transcendence of the objective, not as a relation but as absolute self-enjoyment” (Bhattacharyya, 1956, p. 89). Putting one's own happiness ahead of practical goals demonstrates freedom as a strongly held ideal that is unaffected by what others think. This contradicts Hannah Arendt's action-oriented definition of freedom in *The Human Condition*: “Freedom in politics is not a manifestation of the will...” According to Arendt (1958/1998, p. 151), it is the ability to make something out of nothing.” Arendt, on the other hand, connects freedom with public action and plurality that comes from intersubjective spaces. Bhattacharyya sees freedom as solitary transcendence that solves modern alienations through introspection rather than social involvement.

In his book *Development as Freedom*, Amartya Sen says, “Freedom is central to the process of development for two distinct reasons: the evaluative reason... and the effectiveness

reason” (Sen, 1999, p. 18). Bhattacharyya, on the other hand, says that freedom is ontological rather than instrumental, and that spiritual progress should be valued more than material progress. When it comes to foreign policy, Bhattacharyya uses Sen's theory to say that freedom should not be seen as an object, but rather that people should seek inner freedom to really be strong in the face of injustice. It is now 2026, and Bhattacharyya's works have caused a lot of trouble in the world of philosophy. His beliefs shape both artificial intelligence governance (which emphasizes human subjectivity) and sustainability ethics (which warns against being overly focused on material things). People are interested in his ideas because they connect old knowledge with the modern fight for freedom.

Conclusion:

Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's concept of the inner dimension of freedom combines fundamental elements from both Eastern thought and Western criticism. It shifts our perspective on freedom, viewing it as an inner transcendence rather than an exterior right. Bhattacharyya discusses how the “I” can become pure, directly experienced truth, as well as how the “self” can be freed from its role as an object. He accomplishes this by discussing three types of freedom: bodily, mental, and spiritual. This mode of thought challenges colonial epistemic slavery by discussing Kantian dualisms and Hegelian historicism. It also promotes “swaraj in ideas” as a means of achieving intellectual liberation. It promotes decolonial resilience in political and social environments by encouraging individuals to seek within themselves as a means of dealing with hierarchical systems. Contemporary philosophical frameworks that address challenges other than simple free will, such as digital alienation, AI ethics, and global identity issues, provide instruments for overall autonomy in the face of fragmentation. Finally, Bhattacharyya's worldview advocates for a reevaluation of introspection in a culture that is primarily concerned with the outer. It also bridges cultural divides to promote the value of freedom for all. His Vedantic phenomenology is crucial to postcolonial discourses because it pushes scholars and practitioners to delve deeply into the subjective in pursuit of revolutionary self-discovery. This study reintroduces inner freedom as the key to human development, demonstrating how his effect continues to this day.

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